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Proposition 140: The Constitutionality of
Term Limits
California Constitution art. IV, §§ 1.5, 4.5, 7.5, art. VII § 11, art.
XX, § 7 (new); art. IV, § 2, art. V, §§ 2, 11, art. IX, § 2, art. XIII,
§ 17 (amended).
1990 CAL. CONST. Prop. 140.*
Proposition 140, also known as the Political Reform Act of
1990,' or the Schabarum Initiative,2  amends California
constitutional provisions regarding specified elected constitutional
offices.3 The measure limits the number of terms that certain
elected state officials may serve in the same office, restricts
legislative retirement benefits, and reduces the total aggregate
expenditures of the legislature.4
* The California Constitution provides that an amendment approved by the voters takes
effect the day after the election unless otherwise provided. CAL. CONSr. art. XVIH, § 4. Proposition
140 became effective Nov. 7, 1990.
1. 1990 Cal. Const. Prop. 140, sec. 1, at_.
2. CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, PROPOSITION 140: THE SCHABARum
INrATIVE, September 1990 (initiative co-sponsored by Peter Schabarun) [hereinafter SCHABARUM
INIIATIVE].
3. LsmIsLArivn ANALYST OF CALIFORNIA, BALLOT PAMPHLET, PROPOSED STATUTES AND
AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION WITH ARGUMENTS TO VOTERS, GENERAL ELECTION
at 69 (Nov. 6, 1990) [hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHL.rE]. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888 n.8,
694 P.2d 744,753 n.8, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631,640 n.8 (1975) (accepting ballot pamphlet summaries and
arguments as source of voters' intent and understanding of the initiative). The office of insurance
commissioner, created in 1988 by Proposition 103, is not affected by Proposition 140. SCHABARUM
INmAATIVE, supra note 2, at 19. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 12900-12901 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990)
(election and qualifications for office of insurance commissioner).
4. See BALLOT PAMPm.Er, supra note 3, at 69. Proposition 140 also contains a severability
provision in the event that any part of the initiative is declared invalid. CAL. CONST. art. VII, § I I
(enacted by Proposition 140).
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TERM LMIrs
The California Constitution creates a number of elected state
offices, specifies the term for each office, and prescribes required
qualifications for each office.5 Until the passage of Proposition
140, the constitution did not limit the number of terms that an
elected official could serve in a particular office.6
The offices of governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general,
secretary of state, superintendent of public instruction, treasurer,
Board of Equalization member, and state senator presently have
constitutionally mandated four-year terms.7 Proposition 140 limits
office-holders in these positions to a maximum of two four-year
terms.' Membership in the state assembly has a constitutionally
specified term of two years.9 Proposition 140 restricts state
assembly members to a maximum of three two-year terms.'*
Rather than limiting the number of consecutive terms that an
official may serve, Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban on any
office-holder who has served the maximum allotted number of
terms in a particular office." The term limits apply only to those
5. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § I (creating the California legislature); id. art. IV, § 2 (specifying
the length of terms and listing the qualifications for membership in the Legislature); id. art. V, § 1
(creating office of governor); id. art. V, § 2 (specifying length of term and qualifications for office
of governor); id. art. V, § 9 (office of lieutenant governor); 1d. art V, § 11 (offices of secretary of
state, treasurer, and controller); id. art. V, § 13 (creating office of and specifying duties of attorney
general); id. art. IX, § 2 (office of superintendent of public instruction); id. art. XIII, § 17
(membership of Board of Equalization).
6. SCHAARUm INrrrA'va, supra note 2, at 5.
7. CAL CONsT. art. IV, § 2(a) (senator); id. art. V, § 2 (governor); id. art. V, § 11 (lieutenant
governor, attorney general, controller, secretary of state, and treasurer); id. art. IX, § 2 (superintendent
of public instruction); id. art. XIII, § 17 (Board of Equalization).
8. I art. IV, § 2(a) (amended by Proposition 140) (senate); id. art. V, § 2 (amended by
Proposition 140) (governor); id. art. V, § I1 (amended by Proposition 140) (lieutenant governor,
attorney general, controller, secretary of state, and treasurer); id. art. IX, § 2 (amended by Proposition
140) (superintendent of public instruction); id. art. XIII, § 17 (amended by Proposition 140) (Board
of Equalization).
9. Id. art. IV, § 2(a).
10. Id. (amended by Proposition 140).
11. SCHABARtJM INrTATIV, supra note 2, at 2. Compare 1990 California Proposition 140
(lifetime term limits) and 1990 Oklahoma State Question No. 632 (enacting OKLA. CoNsT. art. V,
§ 17A) (imposing 12 year term limits on the state legislature) with 1990 Colorado Constitutional
Amendment No. 5 (amending COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1, art. V, § 3; enacting CoLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 9) (imposing consecutive term limits on the offices of governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, treasurer, attorney general, state senators, and state representatives to United States
Congress) and 1990 Kansas City (Missouri) Charter Amendment (enacting Kansas City Charter art.
II, § 6.4) (imposing retroactive consecutive term limits on the offices of Mayor and City Council).
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officials elected on or after November 6, 1990.12 However, any




Proposition 140 requires a person elected to or serving in the
legislature on or after November 1, 1990 to participate in the
federal Social Security program.14 The state will pay only the
employer's share of the contribution necessary for a legislator to
participate in Social Security. 5 No other pension or retirement
benefits may accrue from service in the legislature.
1 6
LEGISLATIVE EXPENDITURES
Pursuant to Proposition 140, the total aggregate expenditures
of the legislature in the fiscal year immediately following the
adoption of the initiative17 may not exceed the lesser of $950,000
per member or eighty percent of the legislative budget for the
See Lowe v. Kansas City Bd. of Election Commrs, No. 90-1041-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19,1990)
(1990 W.L. 209974) (upholding Kansas City Charter article I, section 6.4 against challenges based
on Voting Rights Act, equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, and the fifteenth
amendment). But see Term Limits Likely to Face Challenge in Courts, San Francisco Chron., Nov.
8, 1990, at A14 (quoting Chip Nielsen, constitutional lawyer and former GOP Capitol staff member,
as suggesting that because of the language of the term limit provisions, the courts may interpret the
term lHibit provisions of Proposition 140 to allow officeholders who have sat out for a term to run
again because that person is no longer an officeholder but rather a private citizen); Barnett, Prop. 140
Could Survive the State Supreme Court, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 24, 1991, at B9, col. 2 (Proposition
140 may be interpreted as imposing only a ban on more than two consecutive terms, not a lifetime
ban).
12. CAl. CoNsT. art. XX, § 7 (enacted by Proposition 140).
13. Id. Additionally, the term limits do not apply to an unexpired term to which a person is
elected or appointed if the term is more than half completed. Id.
14. Id. art. IV, § 4.5 (enacted by Proposition 140).
15. Id.
16. Id. Proposition 140 precludes legislators from earning state retirement benefits through
legislative service. BAU.oT PAMPHLET, supra note 3, at 69.
17. The fiscal year immediately following the adoption of Proposition 140 begins July 1,
1991. SCHABARUM INTATIVE, supra note 2, at 20.
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preceding fiscal year.'8 The aggregate expenditures in future fiscal
years will be limited to the amount of the previous year's
expenditures plus an amount equal to the percentage increase in the
state appropriation limit allowed by the California Constitution. 9
COMMENT
Being a highly controversial initiative that raises a number of
constitutional issues, Proposition 140 will face state and federal
constitutional challenges of its validity.20
A. Single Subject Rule
One procedural challenge often posited against an initiative is
based upon the "single subject rule" of the California
Constitution.2' Under the constitution, "ain initiative measure
18.. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 7-5 (enacted by Proposition 140). Calculations reveal that the total
aggregate expenditures of the legislature will be limited to $950,000 per member for the fiscal year
1991-92. SCHABARUM INMTAVE, supra note 2, at 21. The first option under Proposition 140
multiplies $950,000 by 120 legislative members, resulting in a legislative expenditure limit of $114
million. Id. Under the second option, the 1990-91 expenditures totaling approximately $180.9 million
are multiplied by 80%, producing alimit of $144.7 million. Id. Assuming that legislative expenditures
would continue to grow at an average annual rate of 7.5%, as they have for the past decade, the
provisions of Proposition 140 will reduce the 1991-92 expenditures by approximately 40% or $80
million. Id.
19. CAL CONST. art. IV, § 7.5 (enacted by Proposition 140). For the fiscal years following
1991-92, the total aggregate expenditures of the legislature will be limited to the amount expended
in the previous fiscal year adjusted by an amount equal to the plrcentage increase in the
appropriations limit pursuant to the California Constitution article XDI(B). Id.
20. On Feb. 21,1991, a lawsuit (case number SO19660) challenging Proposition 140 was filed
with the California Supreme Court.
21. In recent years, a number of initiatives, challenged on the basis of a single subject rule
violation, have been reviewed by the California Supreme Court. See Raven v. Deukmejian, _ Cal.
3d ._, 801 P.2d 1077,276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Dec. 24, 1990) (Proposition 115-Crime Victim Justice
Reform Act); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982)
(Proposition 8-Victims' Bill of Rights); Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d
33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979) (Political Reform Act of 1974); Amador Valley Joint
Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr.
239 (1978) (Proposition 13-tax reform). See generally Comment, The California Initiative Process:
he Demise of the Single Subject Rule, 14 PAc. L.J. 1095 (1983) (permissive 'reasonably germane'
test adopted by the California Supreme Court destroys all constitutional limits on multiple subjects
in initiatives). But see Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject Rule, 30 U.C.LA.
L. REV. 936, 937-38 (1983) (court might choose to abandon permissive test in future review).
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embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the
electors or have any effect."2 According to the California
Supreme Court, the rule was enacted primarily to minimize the
risks of voter confusion and to avoid "logrolling" by special
interests.23 As such, the court, when resolving a challenge based
upon the single subject rule, considers the amount of public
scrutiny and debate over the initiative as well as the explanation of
the provisions of the initiative provided in the voter ballot
pamphlet.24
In Raven v. Deukmejian,' the most recent application of the
single subject rule to an initiative, the California Supreme Court
stated that "an initiative measure does not violate the single subject
rule 'if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are
"reasonably germane" to each other,' and to the general purpose
or object of the initiative."" When applying this "reasonably
germane" standard, the court has recognized that the rule should
be liberally construed and that, in accord with a policy favoring the
initiative process, the voters will not be limited to brief general
statements, and the initiative may deal comprehensively and in
22. CAL CONST. art. II, § 8(d). Approved in 1948, the rule is thought to have been adopted
in response to a multifaceted initiative invalidated by the court in McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal, 2d
330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948) (holding that the initiative consisting of 12 sections, 208 subsections,
21,000 words, and dealing with such varied subjects as pensions, oleomargarine, gambling, elections,
and mining should not be placed on the ballot because the initiative amounted to a revision of the
constitution rather than an amendment), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at
229, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
23. Araador, 22 Cal. 3d at 231-32,583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249. See BLACK'S LAW
DICT1ONARY 849 (5th ed. 1979) ("logrolling" defrmed as a practice of including in one statute or
constitutional amendment more than one proposition, inducing voters to vote for all, notwithstanding
they might not have voted for all if amendments or statutes had been submitted separately).
24. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 231-32, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
25. _ Cal. 3d ... 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Dec. 24, 1990). At the time of the
publication deadline for this edition of the Pacific Law Journal, page number cites for the Raven case
were available only for West's California Reporter. Consequently, subsequent references to this case
will cite only to the California Reporter.
26. Id., 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (quoting Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 245, 651 P.2d'
274, 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35 (1982)). In addition to the "reasonably germane- test, a second more
restrictive test was suggested in a dissenting opinion by Justice Manuel in Schmitz v. Younger. See
Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 100, 577 P.2d 652, 656, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 522-23 (1978)
(Manuel J., dissenting). This test would require the initiative's provisions to be functionally related
in furtherance of a common underlying purpose. Id.
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detail with an area of law.27 In Brosnahan v. Brown,28 the court
held that while it might disagree with the wisdom of an initiative,
it was not the court's function to pass judgment on the propriety or
soundness of the measure, and that in the absence of a compelling
and overriding constitutional imperative the court would not
prohibit the people from expressing their will.
29
The stated intent of Proposition 140 is to limit the powers of
incumbent representatives, thereby restoring a free and democratic
system of fair elections and encouraging qualified citizen
representatives to seek public office." In order to limit the powers
of incumbency, the measure declares that term limits must be
imposed, retirement benefits restricted, and staff and support
services limited. 1 The drafters of Proposition 140 believe that the
interaction of these three major reforms will preclude politicians
from a career in political office.
3 2
In order for Proposition 140 to survive the scrutiny of the
single subject rule, the measure's provisions--specifically limits on
terms, retirement benefits, and legislative expenditures--must be
found to be reasonably germane33 to each other and to the object
of political reform, and not an attempt at logrolling unpopular
27. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 33,41,599 P.2d 46,50, 157
Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (1979). The court has held that the provisions of some initiatives have been
interdependent and interlocking but that this relationship was not essential to a measure's validity.
Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 249, 651 P.2d at 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37. The court has also rejected an
argument that the single subject rule requires a showing that each of the provisions of the initiative
was capable of gaining voter approval independently. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
28. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
29. Id. at 248, 651 P.2d at 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37. "We [the court] avoid an overly strict
judicial application of the single-subject requirement, for to do so could well frustrate legitimate
efforts by the people to accomplish integrated reform measures. As we have previously observed, the
initiative procedure itself was specifically intended to accomplish such kinds of reforms through its
function as a 'legislative battering ram.' We should dull or blunt its force only for reasons that are
constitutionally mandated .... " Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 232, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291-92, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249-50 (1978).
30. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.5 (enacted by Proposition 140).
31. Id.
32. SCHABARuM INIIAT1VE, supra note 2, at 6.
33. See Raven v. Deukmejian, _...._a1. 3d , , 801 P.2d 1077, .... _, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326,
332 (1990) (quoting Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 245, 651 P.2d at 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35) (subjects
must be reasonably germane). "Numerous provisions, having one general object .... may be united
in one act." Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 33, 38, 599 P.2d 46, 48, 157
Cal. Rptr. 855, 857 (1979).
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reforms.' In making these determinations, the court must consider
whether the reforms proposed by the measure received considerable
public scrutiny and debate in the media and the ballot pamphlet.35
The clearest argument under the single subject rule in
opposition to Proposition 140 is that the initiative deals with three
distinct subjects rather than a single subject. If the court concluded
that the three categories of reforms--limits on terms, retirement
benefits, and legislative expenditures--were not reasonably germane
to each other or to the object of political reform through the
reduction in the power of incumbency, then Proposition 140 would
fail the single subject requirement. An argument may be made that
the express purpose of the measure--political reform through the
limitation of the powers of incumbency--is adequately served by
the term limit provision alone, and that the provisions limiting
retirement benefits and legislative expenditures are not reasonably
germane to the term limit provision or to the general object of
reducing the powers of incumbency.3"
Opponents may also contend that voter confusion and
frustration was at a premium during the November election due to
the number of highly-publicized propositions on the ballot, the
volume of material contained in the ballot pamphlet, and the
existence of a similar competing term limit initiative, Proposition
131. 3' However, due to the California Supreme Court's liberal
34. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 231-32, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249.
35. Id. A preliminary search revealed over 250 pre-election newspaper and magazine articles
mentioning Proposition 140.
36. The need for reform in the area of legislative expenditures, as a method of limiting an
incumbent's power is questionable. For the past 20 years, legislative expenditures have consistently
represented between 0.32% and 0.58% of the state's general fund expenditures. SCHABARUM
INITATvE, supra note 2, at 23. Among the 10 largest states, California ranked fifth in legislative
expenditures as a percentage of total state expenditures. Id. at 25. Proposition 140 is estimated to
reduce state expenditures by $67 million or approximately 0.12% of total budget expenditures. Id.
at 22.
37. CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, AFTER THE ELECTION: ANALYSIS OF
SUCCESSFUL PROPOSITIONS ON THE NOVEMBER 1990 BALLOT at i (1990) (28 ballot propositions
including 13 "complicated" initiatives). Proposition 131, a wide-ranging government ethics initiative
including a consecutive term limit provision, received considerable publicity during the gubernatorial
primaries due to the sponsorship of then California Attorney General John VandeKamp. See
HAsTINGS PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INsTnTuTE, POLInCAL REFORM ACT OF 1990: APPRAISAL OF
1044
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construction of the single subject rule and the court's precedents
validating complex initiatives, it seems likely that Proposition 140
will survive the single subject challenge."
B. Constitutional Revision or Amendment
A second procedural challenge commonly made against
California ballot initiatives is that the measure represents a
constitutional revision rather than a constitutional amendment. The
California Constitution provides that either an amendment or a
revision may be made to the constitution, however, the procedures
vary for each type of modification.39 The voters may amend the
constitution through the initiative process, but a constitutional
revision may be adopted only after convening a constitutional
convention and obtaining popular ratification, or after submission
of the measure to the voters by the legislature. 40
The constitution does not define the terms "revision" or
"amendment," but the courts have developed guidelines to assist
in the analysis.41 When considering whether an initiative is a
PROPOSITION 140, at 1 (1990).
38. For example, the court in Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Ct. upheld the
Political Reform Act of 1974 against a single subject challenge. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v.
Superior CL, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 43, 599 P.2d 46, 51, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (1979). This measure
contained more than 20,000 words, numerous interrelated sections, and involved four separate
substantive subjects: (1) Regulation of election to public office, (2) regulation of ballot measure
petitions and elections, (3) regulation of public official conflicts of interest, and (4) regulation of
lobbyists. Id. at 40, 599 P.2d at 49, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 858. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 276 Cal. Rptr.
326 (1990) (upholding Proposition 115 against single subject challenge); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (upholding Proposition 8 against single subject
challenge); Amador, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (upholding Proposition 13
against single subject challenge).
39. CAL. CONST. arLt. XVIII, §§ 1-4.
40. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 221,583 P.2d at 1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242. See Raven, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 334. "The Legislature... may submit at a general election the question whether to call a
convention to revise the Constitution." CAL. Co NsT. art. XVIII, § 2 (emphasis added). "The electors
may amend the Constitution by initiative." Id. arLt. XVIII, § 3 (emphasis added). "The Legislature
... may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution .... - Id. art. XVIII, § I (emphasis
added).
41. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
1045
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
revision or an amendment, the courts examine both the
quantitative42 and the qualitative43 effects of the measure on the
constitutional scheme."4 A substantial change presented in either
respect may amount to a revision rather than an amendment.45
Quantitatively, Proposition 140 affects six articles of the
constitution through the amendment of five sections and the
addition of five sections.46 The actual amount of text added to the
constitution is relatively minimal.47 Proposition 140, particularly
in comparison to other initiatives upheld by the court as
amendments rather than revisions, may not be so quantitatively
extensive as to change the substantial entirety of the
constitution. 8
From a qualitative perspective, while Proposition 140 may
substantially change the power of incumbents, the proponents of
the initiative will maintain that these changes fall well short of
constituting the far-reaching changes in California's basic
42. A quantitative effect is one that is "so extensive... as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions .... - Id.
at 335 (quoting Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244).
43. Qualitatively, "even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.. . .- Id. at 336
(quoting Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244). For example, an
initiative that purported to vest all judicial power in the legislature would be in effect a revision
regardless of the length or complexity of the measure or the number of articles and sections the
measure effected. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
44. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
45. Id. The court in Raven held that Proposition 115's quantitative effect on the California
Constitution was minimal as the measure affected only one article through the addition of three new
sections and the amendment of a fourth section. Id. at 335-36. The court further held that, from a
qualitative standpoint, a section of Proposition 115 unduly restricted judicial power and severely
limited the independent force and effect of the California Constitution. Id. at 336-37.
46. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 3, at 137-38.
47. Id. The text added to the constitution contains approximately 600 words. See id. Cf.
McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 349-50, 196 P.2d 787, 799 (1948) (invalidating a measure
adding 21,000 words to the constitution and affecting 15 of the constitution's 25 articles), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
48. See Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36 (upholding Proposition 115's quantitative component);
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 260, 651 P.2d 274, 308, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 44-45 (1982)
(upholding Proposition 8's quantitative component); Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 224, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal, Rptr. 239, 244
(1978) (upholding Proposition 13's quantitative component).
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governmental plan necessary to invalidate the measure.49 In fact,
the stated objective of Proposition 140 is to reduce the power of
incumbency and to re-establish the system of representative
government envisioned by the Founding Fathers.5" Additionally,
it may be argued that any reduction in the power of the legislature
accompanying Proposition 140 will be offset by an equal reduction
in the power of the executive branch caused by the term limits
imposed on the office of the governor.5"
On the other hand, Proposition 140 imposes a strict spending
limit on the legislative branch, but not on the executive or judicial
branches. 2 If the effect of the spending limit is to reduce
legislative power in relation to the other branches, the qualitative
effect of the initiative may be to disturb the proper checks and
balances among the three branches of government. 3 This balance
of power is an integral component of our democratic
government"4 and, if altered, may have such far reaching effects
on the basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
49. Cf. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (holding that a provision of Proposition 115 that, in
practicality, placed all judicial interpretive power regarding fundamental criminal defense rights in
the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States, constituted far-reaching changes in the basic
governmental plan).
50. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 3, at 137 (emphasis added).
51. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (amended by Proposition 140) (governor).
52. SCHABARUM INrr'riTVE supra note 2, at 25.
53. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 355-56 (J. Madison) (B. Wright
ed. 1961) (discussing the need for checks and balances). Madison describes how the "partition of
power" would be maintained by "'so contriving the interior structure of government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
place." Id. Madison continues:
[b]ut the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others. ... It may be a reflection on human nature that
such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
Id. at 356.
54. See id. at 355.
55. See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 222-23, 583 P.2d 1281, 1285, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 (1978) (reiterating that the measure
in McFadden v. Jordan was invalidated because of its effects on the government's checks and
balances and offering as an example of a revision an initiative vesting all judicial power in the
legislature); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,260-61, 651 P.2d 274,289, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,45
1047
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Further, opponents of Proposition 140 may look to the Founding
Fathers for support. The writings of Alexander Hamilton reveal that
the Founding Fathers debated and rejected term limits as ill-
founded. 6
Unless the court finds that the initiative's effect will be to
weaken the checks and balances of the legislature in favor of the
executive and judicial branches of government, Proposition 140
will probably survive the revision/amendment review.
C. Equal Protection
Proposition 140 also faces potential challenges based upon the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." The
measure's stated intent is to limit the power of incumbent
candidates only, thereby distinguishing incumbents from other
potential candidates.5" A state has the right to set qualifications
for public office so long as it is done in accord with the state
(1982) (challenge of Proposition 8, alleging it would interfere with the judiciary's ability to perform
its constitutional duty). In Brosnahan, however, the court determined that the claim that Proposition
8 would interfere with the judiciary was "wholly conjectural" and that "nothing on the face of the
article ... confirms that the article necessarily and inevitably will produce" the feared results.
Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 261, 651 P.2d at 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The court in Raven v.
Deukmejian invalidated a section of Proposition 115 because the court determined that the practical
effect of the section would be to unduly restrict judicial power by vesting all interpretive power in
the Supreme Court of the United States and, thus, have a devastating qualitative effect on the
California Constitution. Raven v. Deukmejian, ___Cal. 3d .. ... 801 P.2d 1077, _ 276 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 336 (1990).
56. THE FEDERAu T No. 72, at 462 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
Mhe circumstance of reeligibility... is necessary to enable the people, when
they see reason to approve of his [elected official] conduct, to continue him in
his station, in order to prolong his talents and virtues, and to secure to the
government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration.
[E]xclusion, whether temporary or perpetual.... would be for the most part
rather pernicious than salutary. One ill effect of the exclusion would be a
diminution of the inducements to good behavior.
Id.
57. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The California Constitution article 1, section 7 (former
sections I1 and 21 of article I, as renumbered Nov. 5, 1974) makes guarantees similar to the equal
protection clause of the federal Constitution. De Bottari v. Melendez, 44 Cal. App. 3d 910,914, 119
Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (1975).
58. See CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.5 (enacted by Proposition 140) (intent of Proposition 140).
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constitution and the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.59  Although a state may prescribe
regulations for a public office, the state may not enact arbitrary
requirements for public office.'
If a claim is made under the equal protection clause, the courts
must first determine the appropriate level of review to utilize when
examining the issue.6" There has been uncertainty among the
courts as to whether the right to hold public office constitutes a
fundamental right.62 In Zeilenga v. Nelson,63 the California
Supreme Court recognized the right to hold public office as a
fundamental right."4 Subsequent to the California Supreme Court's
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Bullock v.
Carter,65 declined to decide whether the right to candidacy,
59. Spencer v. Board of Education, 69 Misc. 2d 1091, 333 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1972). A state's
right to impose restrictions on one seeking public office is a power reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (D.N.H.
1973).
60. Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716,721,484 P.2d 578,581,94 Cal. Rptr. 602,605 (1971)
(holding that durational residency requirements for candidacy were excessive, arbitrary, and denied
equal protection).
61. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to and invalidating
a statute requiring candidates to pay a substantial filing fee before becoming a candidate for public
office).
62. Compare Zeilenga, 4 Cal. 3d at 721,484 P.2d at 581, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 605 (holding that
the right to hold public office is a fundamental right) with Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43 (stating that
the Court had not attached fundamental status to candidacy). The courts use the phrases "the right
to hold public office" and "the right to candidacy" interchangeably. See Zeijenga, 4 Cal. 3d at 721-
723, 484 P.2d at 581-582, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 605-606; De Bttari v. Melendez, 44 Cal. App. 3d 910,
915, 119 Cal. Rptr. 256, 259 (1975); Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d 96, 99, 507 P.2d 628, 630, 107
Cal. Rptr. 20, 22 (1973). However, it is a weli settled principle that there exists "a federal
constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously
discriminatory disqualifications." Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1970) (emphasis added).
63. 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971).
64. Id. at 721,484 P.2d at 581, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 605. The court also held that a restraint on
eligibility for elective office imposed a restraint on the right to vote as well. Id. As a result, the court
concluded that the right to run for public office is as fundamental as the right to vote. Id. at 723, 484
P.2d at 582, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 606. Further, the court held that the right to vote would be an empty
right if it did not include the right of choice for whom to vote. Id. at 721, 484 P.2d at 581, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 605. Therefore, the right to hold public office is also subject to frst amendment protection.
Id. See also Cummings v. Godin, 119 RI. 325, 335-36, 377 A.2d 1071, 1075-76 (1977) (holding
public office, like candidacy for public office, is a significant form of political expression and
activity; holding public office is a right included within the ambit of the fast amendment).
65. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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standing alone, is fundamental.' Rather, the Court discussed the
interrelation between the laws affecting the right to candidacy and
the right to vote.' Following the decision in Bullock, the
California Supreme Court, without abandoning its position in
Zeilenga, adopted the posture of the federal courts in determining
what level of review to apply by examining the impact of
restrictions on holding public office on other fundamental rights,
such as the right to vote."
If, in the term limitation context, the right to hold public office
is not deemed fundamental, Proposition 140 will be valid if it bears
a "rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."' If,
however, the court considers this a fundamental right, the court will
apply strict scrutiny, and the state will bear the burden of proving
that the initiative furthers a compelling state objective and that the
provisions of Proposition 140 are necessary to further that
objective.7" The strict scrutiny analysis is also designed to
determine whether the least restrictive method of achieving the
state interest has been utilized.7 If strict scrutiny is applied to
Proposition 140,72 the state might assert as a compelling state
interest the need to maintain a responsive and responsible
government through the democratic process.73 The state might
66. Id at 142-43.
67. Id. at 143.
68. De Bottari v. Melendez, 44 Cal. App. 3d 910,915, 119 Cal. Rptr. 256,259 (1975). Three
California Supreme Court cases, Zeilengq, Thompson v. Mellon, and Johnson v. Hamilton, held that
the right to vote and the right to hold public office were equally fundamental and required strict
scrutiny review when classifications implicated these rights. Zeilenga, 4 Cal. 3d at 723, 484 P.2d at
582, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 606; Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d 96, 102, 507 P.2d 628, 630, 107 Cal. Rptr.
20,22 (1973); Johnson v. Hamilton, 15 Cal. 3d 461,468,541 P.2d 881, 884, 125 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132
(1975). These cases dealt with statutory durational residence requirements placed on candidates in
order to qualify for replacement on the ballot.
69. Johnson, 15 Cal. 3d at 466, 541 P.2d at 883, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
70. Id.
71. Zeilenga, 4 Cal. 3d at 723, 484 P.2d at 582, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
72. "'To justify any impairment of [fundamental] rights, there must be present a compelling
govenunental interest." Id. at 721, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
73. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (D. N.H. 1973) (holding that the state had
a compelling interest in maintaining a responsive and responsible government through the democratic
process sufficient to support a durational residency requirement for office of governor). However,
Chimento may be distinguishable from the present case because the court noted that the residency
requirement was not a complete barrier to the office but only caused a delay in seeking office. Id.
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then argue that the political system has become less representative
and less competitive due to the increased power of incumbency,
and that Proposition 140 was passed to remedy this problem by
restricting the power of incumbency.74 The argument would
follow that each provision of the initiative is necessary in order to
achieve the proposition's stated purpose: the term limits prohibit an
incumbent from re-election after a second term (a third term for
members of the assembly); the limits on legislative expenditures
reduce the legislative staff available to assist an incumbent during
a campaign;' and the restrictions on retirement benefits remove
an incentive for re-election.76 Finally, the state may argue that
limited terms will result in legislators being more responsive to the
citizens of the state by discouraging long-standing relationships
between legislators and special interest groups.77
The court, however, may find that certain provisions of
Proposition 140 are not the least restrictive methods of limiting the
power of incumbency.7" For example, the court might question
how restrictions on retirement benefits will actually reduce the
power of an incumbent, and query whether this restriction may
even discourage well-qualified potential candidates who desire the
security of an employer-sponsored retirement program. The court
may also consider whether the goal of restricting the power of
incumbency is equally served by consecutive term limits, as
opposed to a lifetime ban. If a legislator's source of power
emanates from holding the office, then the court may find that once
at 1216. The Chimento court appeared to give more deference to the state's assertion that its interest
was compelling because the residency requirement was contained in the constitution, as opposed to
a statute. Id.
74. See BALLoT PAMPm.Er, supra note 3, at 137.
75. See Gray Davis StaffAllegedly Mixed Politics With Job, LA. Times, Aug. 31, 1987, part
1, at 3, col. 5 (former Davis aides told investigators that Davis campaign used legislative staff to help
win state controller's office); Legislative Aides' Campaign Role Growing Critics Say; Political
Troops Often on State Payrolls, L.A. Times, May 18, 1987, part 1, at 1, col. 4 (legislative employees
used when workers needed in state Senate elections).
76. See BALLoT PAMPHLET, supra note 3, at 70.
77. Id.
78. See Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 723, 484 P.2d 578, 582, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606
(1971) (holding that a durational residency requirement was not the least restrictive method of
achieving state's objective).
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the legislator is no longer in office, the power of incumbency is
disrupted. Because this disruption can be achieved through either
consecutive term limits or a lifetime ban, the court may find
consecutive term limits less onerous, and invalidate Proposition
140's permanent ban.7 9
Although Proposition 140 may be subjected to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause, the measure will likely survive
this challenge. The court will probably find that the state has a
compelling interest in restricting the power of incumbents in order
to maintain a responsive and responsible government, and that the
provisions of Proposition 140 are narrowly tailored to this purpose.
D. Due Process
A challenge to Proposition 140 based upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment would most likely be
unsuccessful. In order to find a violation of due process, the court
must find a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.8" In Taylor v.
Beckham,81 the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that
public offices are agencies or trusts, rather than property.82 In a
clear statement of its view, the California Supreme Court has said,
"it is well settled that there is no vested right in an incumbent to
an office, nor any property right therein paramount to the public
interest." 83 In a later case, the same court also held "that public
employees have no vested right in any particular measure of
compensation or benefits and that these may be modified or
79. Cf. SCHABARUM .NITIATIE, supra note 2, at 15 (questioning the need for lifelong term
limits). Several other questions pertaining to equal protection challenges arising from the application
of Proposition 140 include: (1) Will reducing legislative expenditures really reduce the power of the
incumbents, or the power of the legislature as a whole? (2) Will the cuts in legislative expenditures
cause staff lay-offs and thereby reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislature? (3) Will
restrictions on the legislative retirement system discourage from participation any lower-income
candidates who cannot afford to provide economic security for themselves and their families?
80. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
81. 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
82. Id. at 576-77.
83. Deupree v. Payne, 197 Cal. 529, 538, 241 P. 869, 873 (1925).
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reduced ... ."" From these precedents, it appears that the court
will find that there is no property right in holding public office.
E. Voting Rights Act
Proposition 140 may also face a challenge based on a violation
of the Voting Rights Act.85 According to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the Voting Rights Act is "aimed at the subtle,
as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of
denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." 86 Under
the Voting Rights Act, a court will attempt to determine if minority
groups are given less opportunity to vote than other members of
the electorate and if the denial of the right to vote occurs on
account of race or color."
A potential Voting Rights Act argument against Proposition
140 is that the voters at the statewide level have deprived the
voters in minority-dominated legislative districts of the right to be
represented by experienced legislators of the district's choice.8
Additionally, it may be argued that the special needs of the
minority districts for experienced legislators will cause these
districts to bear a disproportionate impact of the term limits. 9
In opposition to this challenge, proponents of Proposition 140
can argue that all members of the electorate, regardless of race, are
equally affected in their choice of candidates because all California
legislators are subject to the term limits.9" Further, proponents of
84. Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 150, 82 P.2d 434, 439 (1938).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). See Lowe v. Kansas City Bd. of Election Comm'rs, No. 90-
1041-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 1990) (1990 W.L. 209974). In December 1990, a consecutive
term limit amendment to the city charter of Kansas City, Missouri survived a challenge asserting that
the voters at large, through the amendment, deprived voters in minority-dominated districts of the
right to be represented by experienced council members of their own choice. Id. This challenge was
based on the Voting Rights Act, the equal protection clause, and the fifteenth amendment. Id.
86. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969). The Court held that -[t]he right
to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting
a ballot." Id. at 569.
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Proposition 140 may posit that the measure does not dilute
minority voting strength as the composition of the districts remains
unchanged, and that any abridgement of the right to vote is not on
account of race or color.9 Perhaps the most effective rejoinder to
the Voting Rights Act challenge is a federal district court's holding
in Lowe v. Kansas City Bd of Election Comm'rs,92 that
disproportionate impact within reasonable limits does not violate
the Voting Rights Act.93 The impact of Proposition 140 on
minority voters appears benign enough to be reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 140 is likely to survive review under the California
Supreme Court's current liberal construction of the single subject
rule. Although there may be qualitative consequences of
Proposition 140, such as a change in the balance of power among
the branches of the government, the initiative will survive this
review unless certain predicted consequences come to fruition.
As against an equal protection claim, Proposition 140 will
probably be subjected to strict scrutiny review because the court
will determine that the fundamental right to vote is implicated by
the initiative. Proposition 140 might withstand this review because
the court will probably conclude that maintaining a responsive and
responsible government is a compelling state interest, and that the
provisions of Proposition 140 are necessary and narrowly tailored
to achieve the objective.
A due process claim will probably fail because the court will
follow its precedents and conclude that there is no property right
established in holding public office. Finally, Proposition 140 will
1054
91. See id.
92. No. 90-1041-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 1990) (1990 W.L. 209974).
93. Id.
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likely survive a challenge based on the Voting Rights Act because
the impact of Proposition 140 will probably be found to be within
reasonable limits of the Voting Rights Act.
Reed Schreiter
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